Threat research

A fake verification stage revealed a hidden clipboard command

A script fetched during Radar’s wtdistributors[.]com scan revealed a ClickFix sequence in a separate offline browser experiment: a robot-check lure, a copied PowerShell command and instructions to paste it into a terminal. Radar did not run the command.

A script fetched during Radar’s wtdistributors[.]com scan revealed a ClickFix sequence in a separate offline browser experiment: a robot-check lure, a copied PowerShell command and instructions to paste it into a terminal. Radar did not run the command.

Daily critical finding · observed

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01A fetched stage is isolated

Radar retained a browser stage from the scan and inspected it in a separate network-denied context. This illustration is not footage of the original site.

02A verification lure copies a command

A bounded interaction triggered one intercepted clipboard write. The text contains a remote retrieval and execution chain; no OS command ran.

03Instructions ask for terminal paste

The captured stage tells the visitor to open PowerShell or Terminal, paste with Ctrl+V and press Enter. Radar captured these instructions without following them.

Illustrated evidence sequence — not a recording of the website. No commands are run. Reduced-motion mode shows static steps.

What Radar observed

The original session fetched a browser stage through an RPC endpoint. In a separate network-denied browser context, one bounded interaction intercepted a command-like clipboard write. Retained before/after screenshots show an imitation verification widget and Windows terminal/paste instructions. The same command text was also visible in the comparison source’s earlier report.

Why it matters

The decisive evidence is the combination of deceptive human-verification instructions and a command copied for terminal execution. This is different from an openly labelled software-install command. The captured text uses PowerShell retrieval and execution aliases and points to fastly.jsdelivr[.]net; that shared CDN hostname alone is not a reason to block all of its users.

Observation limits

The scan began on 29 October 2026 at 23:35 UTC. The clipboard write and instruction screenshots came from a separate offline stage, not the original visitor session. Seven requests were blocked during that experiment. The original page was only partially rendered. Radar did not paste or execute the command, retrieve its downstream payload or establish infection.

Recommended response

Close pages that ask you to open Terminal or PowerShell to prove you are human. Defenders should use the public report’s full command and observation context to investigate the specific destination path, rather than blanket-block a shared CDN. If a command was already executed on a device, follow your organisation’s incident-response process.

View source Radar report

Evidence reflects the scan time. A compromised website can change or be repaired; this is not an assertion about every visitor or its current state.

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